Evolutionary adaptation is a genetic process, but fortunately we can often understand it, to a first approximation, without knowing the genetic details. We use what Grafen (1982) called the phenotypic gambit: traits with the highest fitness will tend to be favoured. An important exception is in certain kinds of social behaviour, such as altruism, where population genetic models demonstrate that traits lowering fitness can be favoured by selection. In this case, the phenotypic gambit can often be preserved by introducing one piece of genetic information, the relatedness of the altruist to its beneficiary. Although this seemingly pollutes the phenotypic gambit with genetics, the main advantage is preserved, for we still assume that we can ignore the genetics underlying the particular trait. The concept of inclusive fitness therefore provides a crucial shortcut for studying social behaviour, and understanding how to apply it is an important goal. Lucas et al. (1996) showed that a method of applying inclusive fitness suggested by Creel (1990) seems to lead to certain anomalies. In this note, I argue that such anomalies are perhaps not surprising for two reasons. First, Creel's (1990) method has not been adequately justified, and is likely to lead to errors. Second, the paradox that led Creel to this method has another resolution.
A little history is required to set the stage. Hamilton (1964) Grafen (1982, 1984) showed that problems arise if one omits the part I have emphasized about stripping all components due to the individual's social environment. The result of this omission is double-counting of fitness components and a wrong result.
Creel (1990), however, noticed that applying this definition seems to lead to a paradox. Imagine an obligately social species: solitary reproduction is impossible. Creel's dwarf mongooses, Helogale parvula, approach this condition, but assume for simplicity that the condition is met absolutely. Assume further that one individual does all the reproducing in the group. Now if we calculate this individual's inclusive fitness, we find that it seems to be zero; all of its reproduction comes from the efforts of its helpers, and it must all therefore be stripped from the fitness of the reproductive. Only the helpers have positive inclusive fitness because they are assigned the indirect effects on the dominant's reproduction (devalued by their relatedness, r). The apparent paradox lies in the fact that the reproductive has a lower inclusive fitness, which seems to predict that individuals ought to compete to be helpers. This prediction goes contrary to empirical observations that the reproductive position is sought after, and it clashes with the obvious fact that more of the reproductive's genes get transmitted than the helper's.
Creel's solution, which is followed by Lucas et al. (1996) , was to alter the quantity that is supposed to be stripped from direct reproduction. Instead of stripping the effect of that individual's particular social environment, he recommended stripping the same amount, the average social effect, from all individuals. That something is 
